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THE ARAB SPRING’S FOUR SEASONS:
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS AND
THE SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEM
Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud *
INTRODUCTION
In December 2010, public demonstrations erupted
throughout the Middle East against autocratic regimes, igniting a
regional political transformation known as the Arab Spring. While
some of these demonstrations were peaceful, others escalated into
domestic uprisings and civil and international wars. Depending on
events, modern international criminal and humanitarian law provided
certain protections to vulnerable populations. However, international
law did not provide a uniform degree of protection to civilians and
combatants who faced similar circumstances. Post-Arab Spring, some
countries have been relatively stable while others continue to face
internal conflicts; most notably, the violent civil war in Syria
continues to this day.
This article argues for a uniform standard of protections for
all populations affected by armed conflict, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. Part I presents four legal typologies under current
international humanitarian and criminal law using rules codified in
* Jillian Blake is a J.D. graduate of the University of Michigan Law
School, 2011, and an M.A. graduate of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, 2006, and currently practices law at a non-profit organization
in Alexandria, Virginia. Aqsa Mahmud is a J.D. graduate of the University of
Michigan Law School, 2011 and currently practices law as a government attorney in
Washington, D.C. The authors contributed equally to this work and would like to
thank Professor Julian Mortenson for his comments and suggestions on an earlier
draft of this paper.
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the Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions.1 It evaluates each of
five major Arab Spring uprisings (Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, and
Libya) and describes the legal protections that applied in each
country’s revolution or rebellion. Part II analyzes the differences in
protection, focusing on the distinction between international and
non-international armed conflicts under current law, which affords a
significantly lower degree of protection during civil conflicts. Given
the substantial number of non-international armed conflicts in the
modern era, we argue for a uniform standard of protections for all
armed conflicts. Part III shows that current sovereignty trends are
moving away from the concept of an absolute sovereign in favor of a
responsible sovereign who adheres to international standards. This
trend is incompatible with current international law, which provides a
minimal level of protection during civil war, and could therefore
shield sovereigns from liability for mass atrocity crimes. Finally, Part
IV of this article offers solutions to appropriately minimize outdated
sovereignty norms and eliminate unjustified distinctions in the
international legal system using lessons from the Arab Spring. These
solutions include eliminating the distinction between noninternational and international armed conflict in international
humanitarian law and promoting International Criminal Court (ICC)
membership in Arab states.
I. THE FOUR SEASONS: REGIME OF PROTECTIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
International humanitarian law (“IHL”)2 and international
criminal law (“ICL”) afford certain protections in the event of an
armed conflict, genocide, or crimes against humanity. IHL applies in
the event of an armed conflict, characterized as either international or
1 The Hague Conventions signed in 1899 and 1907 codified many of the
rules related to warfare. “Although the Fourth Hague Convention retains modern
currency, today’s rules of IHL are largely founded on the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949, drafted on the heels of World War II and supplemented by their two 1977
Protocols.” Beth Van Schaack & Ron Slye, A Concise History of International
Criminal Law: Chapter 1 of Understanding International Criminal Law 17 (Santa
Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-42, 2007).
2 International humanitarian law is also commonly referred to as law of
armed conflict (LOAC) or law of war.
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non-international in nature. Depending on its classification, specific
protections apply to civilians affected by and combatants taking part
in the conflict. ICL imposes criminal liability on individuals who
commit certain offenses, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. Crimes against humanity include murder,
extermination, enslavement, imprisonment, torture, or rape against a
civilian population. Notably, crimes against humanity are distinct
from war crimes because they do not need to be committed as part
of an armed conflict.
This section outlines an analytical framework to determine
current international protections for various conflict scenarios and
evaluates each of five Arab Spring countries within the framework.
We present four levels of protections based on the occurrence of
crimes against humanity, existence of an armed conflict, and whether
the conflict is international or non-international in nature. We
selected these criteria due to their importance in guiding current
application of international law and relevance to the Arab Spring.
The four legal seasons of the Arab Spring are: (A) outside the scope
of international protections (Tunisia); (B) international criminal nonwar crime protections (Bahrain and Egypt); (C) non-international
armed conflict protections (Syria); and (D) international armed
conflict protections (Libya). This framework will be useful in
analyzing the international legal protections that apply to various
revolution or rebellion situations, especially in relation to each other.
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The Arab Spring’s Four Seasons: Layers of Legal Protection3
Season A
Tunisia

Season B
Egypt & Bahrain

Season C
Syria

Season D
Libya

Domestic Law
Int’l Human
Rights Law

Domestic Law
Int’l Human Rights
Law

Domestic Law
Int’l Human
Rights Law

Domestic Law
Int’l Human Rights
Law

Int’l Criminal Law

Int’l Criminal Law

Int’l Criminal Law

Non-Int’l Armed
Conflict Law

Non-Int’l Armed
Conflict Law
Int’l Armed
Conflict Law

A. Tunisia: Outside the Scope of International Criminal and
Humanitarian Legal Protections
1. Background
On December 17, 2010, a young Tunisian street vendor set
himself on fire in protest against harsh treatment by authorities,
starting the first Arab Spring revolution.4 Following his
demonstration, riots broke out in the city of Sidi Bouzid and
continued throughout the new year,5 as protestors rallied across the
country over socioeconomic and political issues.6 On January 12,
2011, rioting spread to the capital of Tunis, and a national curfew was
3 Note that each Season adds to the degree of protections from previous
Seasons. For example, Season B includes Season A protections but adds
international criminal law protection. Notably, when the various legal bodies
conflict, one may trump; for example, international humanitarian law will trump
international human rights law as lex specialis.
4 THE ‘SPARK’ THAT STARTED IT ALL, ARAB SPRING: A RESEARCH &
STUDY GUIDE,
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163144
(last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
5 Tunisia: 11 die in new clashes after weeks of unrest, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 9,
2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/09/tunisia-clashes-weeksunrest.
6 ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21666, POLITICAL
TRANSITION IN TUNISIA 4 (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21666.pdf.
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imposed.7 Reports emerged of police firing on protestors and some
protestors being abused in detention,8 with the abuse rising to a level
“that may [have] amount[ed] to torture.”9 On January 14, 2011,
President Zine el-Abedine ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, and an
interim government took control until future elections.10 In October
2011, Tunisia held elections that put the new National Constituent
Assembly into power.11
2. Classification
The Tunisian revolution (also referred to as the “Jasmine
Revolution”) qualifies as “Season A”—outside the scope of ICL and
IHL—because no armed conflict took place and the government’s
actions fail to meet the standard for international criminal liability.
Although at times violent,12 clashes between demonstrators and
security forces did not reach the degree of intensity found in armed
conflict.13 Furthermore, protestors in Tunisia were for the most part
unarmed and lacked centralized organization required for an armed
conflict.
The government’s attacks against civilians are unlikely to
meet the requirements for crimes against humanity. Crimes against
humanity are defined as certain enumerated offenses committed as

7 ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21666, TUNISIA: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
AND
POLICY
ISSUES
2
(2011),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155560.pdf.
8 Id. at 1-2.
9 WORLD REPORT 2012: TUNISIA, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2012),
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-tunisia.
10 Angelique Chrisafis & Ian Black, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali forced to flee
Tunisia as protesters claim victory, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-countryprotests.
11 Although Tunisia continues to face transitional challenges, the scope
of our analysis focuses on the events leading up to the first transition of power
during the Arab Spring revolutions. See ARIEFF, supra note 6, at 2.
12 ARIEFF, supra note 7, at 2; Tunisia: 11 die in new clashes after weeks of unrest,
supra, note 5.
13 See infra Part II.C.1, Season C for an in depth discussion of factors
determinative of an armed conflict legal classification.
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part of a widespread attack against civilians.14 According to the
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute, Article 7, crimes
against humanity include:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international
law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity
on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that
are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health.15

14

See infra Part II.B.
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For acts to be considered “crimes against humanity,” they
must be committed as “part of a widespread or systematic attack,
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack.”16 The population must be predominantly civilian to be
characterized as such for crimes against humanity liability.17
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the existence of a “widespread or systematic
attack” can be determined by a variety of factors, including the “the
number of victims, the nature of the acts, the possible participation
of officials or authorities or any identifiable patterns of crimes.”18 In
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, the ICTY noted that
[t]he existence of an acknowledged policy targeting a
particular community, the establishment of parallel
institutions meant to implement this policy, the
involvement of high-level political or military
authorities, the employment of considerable financial,
military or other resources and the scale or the
repeated, unchanging and continuous nature of the
violence committed against a particular civilian
population are among the factors which may
demonstrate the widespread or systematic nature of
an attack.19
According to the United Nations, 300 people died in the
Tunisia uprising, and 700 were injured between December 17, 2010
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 38544, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
16 Id.
17 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Opinion and Judgment, para.
638(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf
[hereinafter
Tadic Judgment].
18 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 95 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kunaj020612e.pdf.
19 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
para. 53 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/jel-tj991214e.pdf.
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and January 14, 2011.20 While the government unlawfully killed many
people during the uprising, the crimes did not reach the level of
“massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of
victims,” articulated by the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in Prosecutor v. Akayesu.21 However, there is no clear
standard for how many victims meet the “widespread” requirement,
and the analysis is largely subjective.22 Therefore, there may be
reasonable disagreement on this point.
Furthermore, there was no indication of a “systematic”
attack, such as a plan or policy, by the government. The actions of
the Tunisian government during the revolution were not part of a
“continuous” policy, but rather a short-term, uncoordinated response
to a domestic uprising. Because of these requirements for crimes
against humanity liability, the actions of the Tunisian government
during the Arab Spring do not meet the international definition of
crimes against humanity.
3. Protections
Of the countries to be discussed in this paper, Tunisia
suffered the fewest casualties and related crimes during the Arab
Spring. Because the case of Tunisia was outside the scope of ICL and
IHL, domestic law and applicable international human rights law
governed the revolution. Any international protections under
customary international law would still apply as well as any human
rights agreement to which Tunisia is a party;23 however, this paper
focuses on international criminal and humanitarian protections as

See 300 people died in Tunisian uprising—UN, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
May 22, 2011, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/7989/300-people-died-in-tunisianuprising—un.
21 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 580
(Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.pdf
22 See Simon Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements
of Crimes Against Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307, 315 (2000).
23 For example, Tunisia is a signatory to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
20
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codified under the Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions as
interpreted by international courts and other authoritative bodies.
B. Egypt and Bahrain: International Criminal Legal Protections
1. Background
a. Egypt – The revolution in Egypt began on January 25, 2011
with a series of mass demonstrations in Cairo and other cities,
demanding an end to President Hosni Mubarak’s almost 30-year
rule.24 The government blamed the uprising on the officially banned
Muslim Brotherhood opposition faction.25 According to independent
observers, however, the discontent with Mubarak was extensive and
caused by popular discontent with government corruption and
economic grievances.26
By February, the unrest had resulted in 900 deaths, Mubarak
was forced to resign, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF) took control of the country.27 SCAF claimed to work on
behalf of the protestors, restoring justice and establishing a new
political order.28 In March 2011, a new constitution was approved
with 77 percent support which included provisions on presidential
term limits, judicial oversight for elections, and changes in
presidential candidate qualifications. In late 2011 and early 2012, the
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties were elected to a
majority of the seats in the new Parliament.29 In June 2012, Mubarak
24 THE JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION, EGYPT-ARAB SPRING: A RESEARCH &
STUDY GUIDE,
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2159613
(last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
25 Kareem Fahim, Violent Clashes Mark Protests against Mubarak’s Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/world/middleeast/26egypt.html?pagewant
ed=all.
26 Id.
27 THE JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION, supra note 24.
28 JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL33003, EGYPT IN
TRANSITION 7 (2011) http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/171381.pdf.
29 See Egypt News—Revolution and Aftermath, Topic Coverage, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/egypt/
index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). See also JEREMY STAPP, CONG. RESEARCH
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was tried by an Egyptian court and found guilty and convicted as an
accomplice in the murder of unarmed protestors during the
uprising.30 However, a few months later, an Egyptian court granted
an appeal from Mubarak and ordered a retrial.31 Egypt continues to
face transitional challenges post-Arab Spring—the country’s first
democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, was ousted by the
military in July 2013.32
b. Bahrain – The Arab Spring uprising in Bahrain was inspired,
in part, by the success of the protests in Tunisia and Egypt.33 In midFebruary 2011, demonstrations erupted in the capital Manama against
the monarch King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa.34 According to
international affairs expert Jane Kinninmont, “[a]t the heart of the
uprising [the “Pearl Revolution”] were long-standing grievances over
the distribution of power and wealth—including calls for a fully
elected parliament, an elected government, and an end to the
gerrymandering of elections and corruption.”35 The government
immediately responded with a brutal crackdown, firing on civilians
and detaining opposition leaders.36 One month after the Pearl
SERV., RL33003, EGYPT: BACKGROUND ON U.S. RELATIONS (2014).,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf.
30 David D. Kirkpatrick, New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for
Mubarak, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/world/middleeast/egypt-hosni-mubaraklife-sentence-prison.html?pagewanted=all.
31 Abigail Hauslohner, Egyptian court overturns Hosni Mubarak’s life sentence,
orders retrial, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201301-13/world/36312073_1_hussein-salem-retrial-order-adli.
32 Ben Wedeman, Reza Sayah & Matt Smith, Coup topples Egypt’s Morsey;
deposed
leader
under
‘house
arrest,’
CNN.COM,
Jul.
4,
2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests.
33 Lamis Andoni, Opinion, Bahrain’s contribution to the Arab Spring, ALJAZEERA, Aug. 30, 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/08/20118301473301296.html.
34 BAHRAIN,
ARAB SPRING: A RESEARCH & STUDY GUIDE,
http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163172
(last
visited Dec. 26, 2013).
35 JEAN KINNINMONT, BAHRAIN: BEYOND THE IMPASSE 1 (2012),
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%20E
ast/pr0612kinninmont.pdf.
36 Cynthia Johnston & Frederik Richter, Four killed in Bahrain clashes as
Mideastseethes, REUTERS, Feb. 17, 2011,
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Revolution began, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa authorized Saudi
troops to enter the country to help put down the revolt.37 By March,
security forces had suppressed the demonstrations, making it the only
Arab Spring country to effectively put down its uprising through use
of force.38
The suppression came at a high cost to human rights.
According to an independent commission, the Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry, security forces used excessive force in the
campaign, including torture.39 Almost 3,000 people were imprisoned,
and sixty-four percent of detainees (1,866 individuals) reported being
tortured.40 The commission found that thirty-five people died during
the protests and five detainees were tortured to death.41 According to
Human Rights Watch, Bahrain’s police continue to torture and beat
detainees.42
2. Classification
The Egyptian and Bahrain revolutions qualify as “Season
B”—outside the scope of IHL, but within the scope of ICL. Egypt
and Bahrain are distinguishable from “Season A” and Tunisia
because crimes committed during the uprisings were more
widespread and systematic. The repression in Egypt produced three
times as many casualties as in Tunisia. According to a “high-level
[Egyptian government] inquiry,” police killed almost 900 people
during the uprising and “used snipers on rooftops overlooking
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us-protestsidUSTRE71F41K20110217.
37 Simon Tisdall, Arab spring uprisings: the scorecard, THE GUARDIAN, May
23, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/23/arab-spring-uprisingsthe-scorecard.
38 Bahrain
News-The Protests, Topic Coverage, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/bahrai
n/index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
39 Nada Bakri, Torture used on Protesters in Bahrain, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/24/world/middleeast/reportdetails-excessive-force-used-against-bahrain-protests.html?hp&_r=0
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Bahrain police ‘continue to torture detainees’, BBC, Apr. 29, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17887731.
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Cairo’s Tahrir Square to shoot into the huge crowds.”43 As many as
1,000 people were “disappeared” during the Egyptian revolt, and
Egyptian armed forces reportedly tortured and killed individuals
“across the country.”44 While the Tunisian government repressed and
killed civilians during the Jasmine Revolution, the crimes committed
by the Egyptian government were significantly more widespread,
thereby meeting the chapeau elements for crimes against humanity.
In Bahrain, torture was widespread and systematic during,
and in the wake of, the Pearl Revolution, meeting the requirement for
crimes against humanity liability. There were a large number of
victims, and torture was part of a continuous government policy. The
report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry found
government agencies “followed a systematic practice of physical and
psychological mistreatment, which in many cases amounted to
torture, with respect to a large number of detainees in their
custody.”45
IHL and war crimes protections, to be discussed in the
following “Season C” and “Season D” sections, do not apply because
the revolutions in Egypt and Bahrain did not rise to the level of
armed conflicts. No international armed conflict (IAC) existed
because the government forces did not engage the armed forces of
another state directly or by proxy. Neither situation qualified as a
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) because the opposition
forces lacked the required organization or the situations were limited
in their intensity and protractedness. In Bahrain, the opposition was

Report: Egyptian police responsible for almost all of 900 deaths during 2011
uprisings
and
protests,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
Mar.
13,
2013,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/report-egyptian-police-killed-900-arabspring-uprising-article-1.1287782.
44 Evan Hill & Muhammed Mansour, Egypt’s army took part in torture and
killings during the revolution, report shows, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 10, 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/10/egypt-army-torture-killingsrevolution.
45 REPORT OF THE BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT MISSION OF INQUIRY para.
1238 (2011), http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
.
43
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mainly composed of the youth protest movement46 with dispersed
leadership hosting varying goals.47 The opposition never gained
significant control over Bahraini territory, unlike the opposition
groups in other Arab Spring revolutions.48 In Egypt, the Muslim
Brotherhood represented a highly organized opposition group;
however, it did not engage in extended fighting with the Egyptian
government and took power only after Mubarak resigned and
through the electoral process. In both situations, the violence was
limited in its duration: in Bahrain, the fighting lasted for two months,
and, in Egypt, it lasted for 18 days. The number of casualties in both
situations were significantly less than those in Syria and Libya to be
discussed in the next sections and which qualify as armed conflicts.
Uprisings in Bahrain and Egypt also lacked other factors
indicative of an armed conflict. For example, the fighting did not
spread throughout the country for a long period of time, the Security
Council did not issue resolutions on the conflicts, and opposition
forces had limited access to military-grade weapons.
3. Protections
ICL criminalizes and protects against defined acts rather than
providing a series of blanket protections triggered by exogenous
circumstances, such as an armed conflict. However, enforcement of
ICL protections remains a concern. For example, because most Arab
states are not party to the Rome Statute,49 they are outside the Court’s
jurisdiction except in the case of Security Council referral.
Furthermore, even if the state is party to the Statute, the government
Bahrain youth movement calls protest on Wednesday, REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2011,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/16/bahrain-protests-marchidUSLDE72F16620110316; Barbara Surk & Reem Khalifa, Group: Bahrain detains 5
top
opposition
activists,
WASH.
POST,
Mar.
17,
2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/03/16/AR2011031600375.html.
47 Reese Erlich, Bahrain’s opposition split over violence, DEUTSCHE WELLE,
Dec. 28, 2012, http://www.dw.de/bahrains-opposition-split-over-violence/a16461501.
48 Id.
49 The only Arab states that are party to the Rome Statute are Jordan,
Comoro Islands, Djibouti, and Tunisia (which recently joined in 2011).
46
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is unlikely to refer its own leadership to the ICC for charges related
to the successful suppression of a revolt. In the case of Egypt, former
President Mubarak is currently being tried with other former highlevel officials in domestic courts for killing unarmed protestors.
However, Egypt is not party to the Rome Statute, and the ICC has
no jurisdiction over Mubarak’s violation of international criminal law
without referral by the Security Council. In Bahrain, the government
was able to put down its opposition movement, thereby effectively
insulating itself from prosecution. Arguably, crimes against humanity
were committed in both instances yet neither situation was
prosecuted under ICL.
C. Syria: Non-International Armed Conflict Legal Protections
1. Background
The Arab Spring came to Syria on March 15, 2011, with
protests in the city of Deraa against the Ba’ath Party and demands for
the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad.50 Grievances against the
regime included rampant corruption, lack of political freedoms, high
unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, and
repressive security forces.51 In reaction, the government deployed its
military to put down the uprising, and the government reportedly
fired on civilians,52 used disproportional force,53 and expelled foreign
50 Arab
uprising:
Country
by
country
Syria,
BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482309 (last updated Dec. 16, 2013).
51 JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 1 (2012),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/195385.pdf.
52 See
‘Defected Syria security agent’ speaks out, AL-JAZEERA,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/06/201168175624573155.html
(last modified June 8, 2011); Opposition: 127 dead as Syrian forces target civilians,
CNN.COM,
April
7,
2012,
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-0407/middleeast/world_meast_syria-unrest_1_homs-and-hama-syrian-observatorynetwork-of-opposition-activists?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST.
53 See JOSEPH HOLLIDAY, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, THE
STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA IN 2011 13 (2011),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Struggle_For_Syria.pdf.
(providing a detailed account of military action by the Syrian government through
the end of 2011).
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journalists and news organizations from the country.54 With a strong
crack down on protestors, the conflict became increasingly
militarized between the Syrian government and opposition forces.55
As the fighting continued and escalated, international legal
bodies described Syria to be on the “brink” of non-international
armed conflict.56 By May 2012, the President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared that fighting in at least
two places was at the level of armed conflict of a non-international
character.57 The next month, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous stated that the Syrian
situation could be called a civil war.58 By June 2013, an estimated
100,000 people had been killed in the war and one-third of the
causalities were civilians.59 In an August 2012 report, the U.N.
Human Rights Council commission of inquiry on Syria found
reasonable grounds to believe that Government
forces . . . had committed the crimes against humanity
of murder and of torture, war crimes and gross
violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, including unlawful
killing, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual
violence, indiscriminate attack, pillaging and
destruction of property. . . anti-Government armed
54 Silencing global coverage, Syria detains, expels reporters, COMM. TO PROTECT
JOURNALISTS (July 14, 2011), http://cpj.org/2011/07/silencing-global-coveragesyria-detains-expels-rep.php.
55 Joe Sterling, U.N.: Syria more ‘militarized’ amid abuses from regime, resistance
forces, CNN.COM, May 24, 2012,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/24/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html.
56 Syria: Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INT’L
HUMANITARIAN
LAW
AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/applicable_international_law.php?id_state=211 (last updated
July 13, 2012).
57 Id.
58 Louis Charbonneau & Dominic Evans, Syria in civil war, U.N. official
says, REUTERS, June 12, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/ussyria-idUSBRE85B0DZ20120612.
59 Alan Cowell, War Deaths in Syria Said to Top 100,000, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/world/middleeast/syria.html?_r=0.
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groups did not reach the gravity, frequency and scale
of those committed by Government forces . . . .60
U.S. President Barack Obama and European allies have called
for a U.N. resolution condemning the Assad regime and imposing
sanctions.61 However, as of January 2014, Russia and China have
vetoed three such resolutions, claiming that sanctions would pave the
way for military intervention.62 Because of Russian and Chinese
opposition, the Security Council is unlikely to issue an authorization
for economic sanctions or use of force for third-party intervention.63
According to U.S. government analysts, “[t]he popular-uprisingturned-armed-rebellion against the Assad regime . . . seems poised to
continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias
locked in a bloody struggle of attrition.”64
International concern over Syria increased when reports
surfaced in May 2013 that chemical weapons had been used in Syria.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel confirmed that the
intelligence community “assesses with some degree of varying
confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a
small scale in Syria . . . .” Turkey also voiced its belief that “the
[Assad] regime has used chemical weapons.”65 Medical teams
provided blood samples and eyewitness accounts about victims to the
chemical attacks.66 U.N. investigator Carla Del Ponte also

60 Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of
inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 15, 2012).
61 Julian Pecquet, Russia, China veto U.N. sanctions Against Syria, THE HILL
(July 19, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-eastnorth-africa/238941-russia-china-veto-us-backed-syria-resolution-for-a-third-time.
62 Id.
63 Michelle Nichols, Russia, China veto U.N. Security Council resolution on
Syria, REUTERS, July 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/19/ussyria-crisis-un-idUSBRE86I0UD20120719.
64 SHARP & BLANCHARD, supra note 51, at 1.
65 Syria ‘Ready’ to Allow U.N. Chemical Arms Probe, NUCLEAR THREAT
INITIATIVE (May 10, 2013), http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/syriangovernment-ready-allow-un-chemical-armsprobe/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1.
66 Interview by Christiane Amanpour with Zaher Sahloul, President of
the Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS), in Turkey (April 29, 2013, 5:11 PM
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commented on “strong concrete suspicions but not yet
incontrovertible proof” that opposition forces may have used the
chemical agent sarin.67 In response, United States and the United
Kingdom officials claimed to have found no evidence to support the
opposition’s use of chemical weapons.68
By summer 2013, the evidence of chemical weapons use
prompted the United States government and its allies to consider
military intervention absent Security Council authorization.69 Before
any action was taken, Russia proposed with Syrian consent, that Syria
join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and commit to the
elimination of its chemical weapons stockpile.70 Syria joined the CWC
in October 2013,71 de-escalating the confrontation and option for
intervention proposed by the United States.72
2. Classification
The Syrian revolution and subsequent civil war qualify as
“Season C” –IHL protections apply for a non-international armed
conflict (NIAC). Syria is distinguishable from “Season A” (Tunisia)
and “Season B” (Egypt and Bahrain) in terms of the intensity of the
violence and organization of the oppositional groups, which rose to
the level of an armed conflict.73

ET), http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/29/american-doctor-gives-proofof-chemical-weapon-use-to-u-s/.
67 Patrick J. McDonnell, U.N.’s Carla del Ponte says Syrian Rebels may have
used
sarin,
L.A.
TIMES,
May
6,
2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/06/world/la-fg-wn-un-syria-rebelschemical-weapons-20130506.
68 Anne Gearan, U.S. skeptical on reported use of chemical weapons by Syrian
rebels, WASH. POST, May 6, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0506/world/39054114_1_chemical-weapons-syrian-government-assad-regime.
69 Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud, A Legal ‘Red Line’? Syria and the Use of
Chemical Weapons in Civil Conflicts, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 244, 249-50 (2013).
70 Id. at 250.
71 Paul Adams, Syria chemical weapons: OPCW plea for short ceasefires, BBC,
Oct. 14, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24516303.
72 Blake & Mahmud, supra note 69, at 250.
73 See Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 90 (Int’l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
30,
2005),
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For IHL protections to apply, the situation must first qualify
as an armed conflict. There is no “widely accepted definition of
armed conflict in any treaty.”74 However, all armed conflict “has
certain minimal, defining characteristics that distinguish it from
situations of non-armed conflict or peace.”75 In Prosecutor v. Tadic, the
ICTY found that armed conflict “exists whenever there is a resort to
armed force between States or protracted armed violence between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between
such groups within a State.”76 NIAC excludes “conflicts in which two
or more States are engaged against each other . . . [and] conflicts
extending to the territory of two or more States.”77
International courts have defined characteristics of NIAC
including the “intensity of the conflict and the organisation of the
parties to the conflict.”78 In Prosecutor v. Hardinaj, the ICTY elaborated
on the first criterion of organization. The Trial Chamber summarized
“several indicative factors, none of which are, in themselves, essential
to establish whether the ‘organization’ criterion is fulfilled.” These
. . . include the existence of a command structure and
disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the group;
the existence of a headquarters; the fact that the
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf [hereinafter Limaj
Judgment].
74 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF
ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010).
75 Id. at 2.
76 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm
[hereinafter
Tadic
Interlocutory Appeal].
77 See INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN L., THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 2 (2006),
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%20Law%20
of%20NIAC.pdf (“When a foreign State extends its military support to the
government of a State within which a non-international armed conflict is taking
place, the conflict remains non-international in character.”).
78 Tadic Judgment, supra note 17, at para. 562. See also THE HAGUE
CONFERENCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2010).
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group controls a certain territory; the ability of the
group to gain access to weapons, other military
equipment, recruits and military training; its ability to
plan, coordinate and carry out military operations,
including troop movements and logistics; its ability to
define a unified military strategy and use military
tactics; and its ability to speak with one voice and
negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire
or peace accords.79
The ICTY Judgment identified factors for evaluating the
second criterion of intensity, including
. . . the number, duration and intensity of individual
confrontations; the type of weapons and other
military equipment used; the number and caliber of
munitions fired; the number of persons and type of
forces partaking in the fighting; the number of
casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the
number of civilians fleeing combat zones.80
In addition, U.N. Security Council resolutions on the
situation may indicate the existence of an intense conflict.81 However,
none of the listed factors “are, in themselves, essential to establish
that the criterion [of intensity] is satisfied.”82
The situation in Syria meets the definition of NIAC because,
first, it is confined within the territory of one state 83 and Syria is the
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, para. 60
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf [hereinafter Haradinaj
Judgment].
80 Id. at para. 49.
81 Haradinaj Judgment, supra note 79, at para. 49; Limaj Judgment, supra
note 73, at para. 90.
82 Haradinaj Judgment, supra note 79, at para. 49.
83 While the vast majority of fighting has been confined within the Syrian
State, some fighting has spilled over into Turkey and Lebanon. See Jose Tracey
Shelton, Syria Conflict Continues to Spill Over into Turkey, GLOBAL POST, Oct. 12, 2012,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middleeast/syria/121012/syria-turkey-border-clashes-tensions-assad-fsa; Josh Wood,
79
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only state party to the conflict.84 Additionally, organized groups
engaged in intense fighting characterize the conflict. According to
military analyst Joseph Holliday at the Institute for the Study of War,
“the armed Syrian opposition [the Free Syrian Army] is identifiable,
organized and capable, even if not unified.”85 The Free Syrian Army
(FSA) is an overwhelmingly Sunni umbrella group “nominally
headquartered in Turkey” with ties to three major Syrian militias: the
Khalid bin Walid Brigade, the Harmoush Battalion, and the Omari
Battalion.86 Additionally, “insurgents have been able to maintain
control of key terrain near Damascus and central Homs.”87 Both the
Syrian government and FSA forces also face opposition from alQaeda-linked armed insurgent groups that have complicated and
intensified the civil war.88
The fighting has been ongoing for more than three years,
outlasting any other Arab Spring uprising in terms of sustained,
Sectarian Conflict Kills 17 in Northern Lebanon Spillover of Syrian Civil War, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9. 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/world/middleeast/syriaconflict-spills-over-to-northern-lebanon.html; Joe Parkinson & Maria Abi-Habib,
Syria Fight Spills Over Borders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303815404577333292759
268460.
84 Turkey and Israel have been minimally involved in the conflict,
launching air strikes and artillery attacks within Syria. These attacks have been
relatively isolated incidents and not significant enough to classify the conflict as
international. See Isabel Kershner & Michael R. Gordon, Israeli Airstrike in Syria
Targets Arms Convoy, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/world/middleeast/syria-says-it-was-hit-bystrikes-from-israeli-planes.html; Seyhmus Cakan & Kadir Celikcan, Turkey strikes
back at Syria after mortar kills five, REUTERS, Oct. 3, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-syria-crisisidUSBRE88J0X720121003.
85 JOSEPH HOLLIDAY, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, SYRIA’S ARMED
OPPOSITION 6 (2012),
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.
pdf.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 3.
88 Khaled Yacoub Oweis & Arshad Mohammed, Syria rebels push al Qaeda
back;
U.S.
open
to
Iran
role,
REUTERS,
Jan.
5,
2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/05/us-syria-crisisidUSBREA040DG20140105.
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intense fighting. Both sides are reportedly using military-grade
weapons89 and reports by the media and government sources cite the
use of chemical agents. The government has “relied on artillery
attacks and air power” as well as tank ground attacks.90 It has used
multi-barrel rocket launchers, which opposition forces have also
accessed—likely by stealing them from government weapons
caches.91 Opposition forces are also launching pipe bombs made
from parts taken from unexploded government bombs.92 Recently,
the government has been using cluster bombs, which are inherently
more indiscriminate than conventional bombs.93 Additionally,
chemical weapons likely have been used in the conflict by
government forces and possibly by rebel forces.
The number of deaths, refugees, and material destruction
from the conflict has been devastatingly high. In July 2013, the civil
war had claimed the lives of over 100,000 people94 and the U.N. had
registered 1.8 million refugees from Syria.95 In September 2012, the
opposition group Syria Network for Human Rights “estimated more
than 2.9 million homes, schools, mosques, churches and hospitals
89 David Enders, Access to heavy weapons changing dynamics of Syrian conflict,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 1, 2012,
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/12/01/3699940/access-to-heavyweapons-changing.html.
90 Variety of Weapons Increases in Syrian Conflict (NPR radio broadcast Oct.
27, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.npr.org/2012/10/27/163760135/variety-of-weapons-increases-insyrian-conflict).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 C.J. Chivers, Syria Unleashes Cluster Bombs on Town, Punishing Civilians,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/world/middleeast/syria-uses-clusterbombs-to-attack-as-many-civilians-as-possible.html?_r=0. See generally Cluster
Munitions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/category/topic/arms/cluster-munitions
(last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
94 Syria death toll now about 100,000, says UN chief Ban, BBC, July 25, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760.
95 Patrick J. McDonnell, Don’t reject refugees from Syrian civil war, U.N. tells
world, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-wn-un-syrian-refugees20130717,0,5018699.story.
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had been damaged or destroyed since the uprising began in March
2011.”96 Although the Security Council has not authorized military
action or sanctions, it has issued resolutions condemning the actions
of the Syrian government on the Turkish border.97 Furthermore, the
U.N. Human Rights Council has condemned Syria for war
atrocities.98
The Syrian government has received military support from
Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.99 The opposition received military
support from Saudi Arabia100 and non-military assistance from the
United States,101 France, and the United Kingdom102 prior to the
recent reports of chemical weapons use. In response to chemical
weapons allegations, the United States stated a change in policy from
providing only humanitarian aid to providing military support as
well.103 In July 2013, the U.S. was moving weapons to Jordan with

96 Conflict has left Syria a shell of its former self, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/26/world/la-fg-syria-destruction-20121127.
97 UN condemns Syrian attack on Turkish town, BBC, Oct. 5, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19840022.
98 Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 15, 2012).
99 See Zayn Knaub, Why is Hezbollah in Syria?, SMALL WARS J., (Nov. 19,
2013),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-is-hezbollah-in-syria;
Will
Fulton, Joseph Holliday & Sam Wyer, Iranian Strategy in Syria, INST. FOR THE STUDY
OF WAR, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria; Terry
Atlas, Russia increases Syria Arms while joining push for talks, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct.
31, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-31/russia-increases-syriaarms-while-joining-push-for-talks.html.
100 C.J. Chivers & Eric Schmitt, Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria with
Croatian
Arms,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
25,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/world/middleeast/in-shift-saudis-are-saidto-arm-rebels-in-syria.html.
101 Syria conflict: John Kerry extends U.S. aid to rebels, BBC, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21612130.
102 Ashley Fantz, UK joins France in supporting Syrian rebel coalition,
CNN.COM, Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/20/world/syria-civilwar/.
103 Syria:
U.S.
‘to
arm
rebels’
–
latest,
TELEGRAPH,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10120064/SyriaUS-to-arm-rebels-live.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
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plans to arm “small groups of vetted Syrian rebels . . . .”104 This
change in policy, however, would not internationalize the civil war,
changing it from NIAC to an international armed conflict (IAC).
Internationalization may occur when a foreign state provides
support to an insurgent group against the local government.105 Both
the ICJ and the ICTY have articulated tests for determining state
control, respectively called the effective control test and the overall
control test. In Nicaragua v. U.S., the ICJ held that, for “conduct to
give rise to legal responsibility . . . it would in principle have to be
proved that the state had effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations
were committed.”106 In Tadic, the ICTY espoused its overall control
test that requires that the state: “i) provided financial and training
assistance, military equipment and operational support as well as; ii)
participates in the organization, co-ordination or planning of military
operations.”107 In the case of Syria, U.S. and allied military support to
the opposition would not internationalize the conflict under either
test. Both tests require a degree of control by the foreign state over
the planning of military operations. Sending military supplies, by
itself, fails to satisfy either test.
In Syria, crimes against humanity and widespread torture have
also triggered ICL liability. According to the Public International Law
and Policy Group, “[i]n Syria, mass atrocity crimes are being
committed on a scale not seen since Kosovo, Rwanda, and

Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, & Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Begins
Shipping Arms to Syrian Rebels, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323419604578569830070537040
.html.
105 Sylvain Vité, Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law:
legal concepts and actual situations, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 71 (2009),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-873-vite.pdf.
106 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 115 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
107 Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, para. 198
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf.
104
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Darfur.”108 Government and opposition forces have both committed
international crimes, including unlawful killing and torture, with the
United Nations reporting that the government’s abuses are more
widespread and serious.109 Human Rights Watch reports it has
identified at least 27 torture centers run by Syrian government
intelligence agencies as of 2012.110
Violations of the Geneva Conventions during the civil war
would also trigger war crimes liability. War crimes are the most
serious violations of IHL,111 triggering ICL liability and possible
prosecution by the ICC.112 The Rome Statute mirrors the Geneva
Conventions IAC-NIAC distinction in its criminalization of war
crimes. The Statute sets out four categories of war crimes which
include serious violations of: the four Geneva Conventions; the laws
and customs of international armed conflict; Common Article 3; and
law and customs of non-international armed conflict.113
3. Protections
As a NIAC, the Syrian conflict triggers Article 3, common to
all Geneva Conventions. If Syria were a member of the 1977
Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949—which it is not—additional protections would apply.114 In
PUB. INT’L L. & POL’Y GRP., HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN
SYRIA:
THE
LEGAL
BASIS,
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
(2012),
http://www.internationallawbureau.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/PILPGThe-Legal-Basis-for-Humanitarian-Intervention-in-Syria.pdf.
109 Update 4-Syrian govt forces, rebels committing war crimes –U.N., REUTERS,
Aug. 15, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/15/syria-crisis-un-rightsidUSL6E8JFA3220120815.
110 Syria: Torture Centers Revealed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 3, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/03/syria-torture-centers-revealed.
111 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 76, at para. 128.
112 AMERICAN UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF LAW, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A DISCUSSION GUIDE 12 (John Cerone & Susana SaCouto eds.)
(last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
113 Knut Dormann, War Crimes under the Rome States of the International
Criminal Court, with a Special Focus on the Negotiations on the Elements of the Crimes, 7
MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 341, 343-45 (2003).
114 Common Article 3 is the only provision applicable to noninternational armed conflict unless another arrangement is agreed to by the parties.
108
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addition to NIAC protections, the parties’ conduct also triggers
individual criminal liability under ICL115 including war crimes liability.
Common Article 3 (“CA3”) is a blanket provision that
promises humane treatment by prohibiting the most egregious of
conduct. In certain situations, Protocol II may also apply and go
beyond CA3 to address distinct groups of people and prohibit certain
military conduct. CA3 is the only provision in the Geneva
Conventions to address armed conflict that is non-international in
nature.116 Under CA3,
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of any armed forces who have
laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de
combat’ by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex,
birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall
remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
NIAC may trigger additional protections depending on the state’s status as a party
to other treaty regimes. Examples of other treaty regimes include the 1980
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Protocols; the 1997 Ottawa
Convention banning anti-personnel land mines; the 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention; and the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property and its
1999 Second Protocol.
115 See discussion infra in Season Two analysis, Part II.B.
116 Commentary to the Geneva Conventions (I) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field at 48 (“ . . .
Article 3 . . . is only applicable to them until such time as a special agreement
between the Parties has brought into force between them all or part of the other
provisions of the Convention.”) [hereinafter Commentary to Geneva Convention
I].
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(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and
cared for.
Protocol II provides additional protections to CA3 but has a
narrower scope of applicability.117 While Syria is party to the Geneva
Conventions, it is not party to Protocol II. Protocol II is triggered in
the following situations:
The conflict is between the armed forces of a Party
and “dissident armed forces”;
The dissident armed forces are “under responsible
command”; and
These dissident armed forces “exercise such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations” and
adhere to the Protocol.118

“[W]here the conditions of application of the Protocol are met, the
Protocol and common Article 3 will apply simultaneously, as the Protocol’s field of
application is included in the broader one of common Article 3. On the other hand,
in a conflict where the level of strife if low, and which does not contain the
characteristic features required by the Protocol, only common Article 3 will apply.”
Commentary to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II) 4457 [hereinafter Commentary to Additional Protocol II].
118 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol II)
art. 1, Dec. 12, 1977 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. See
117
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Protocol II expands the list of fundamental guarantees for
persons not taking part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities.
These include:
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental
well-being of persons, in particular murder as well
as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or
any form of corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape,
enforced prostitution and any form of indecent
assault;
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all forms;
(g) pillage;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.”119
Where it applies, Protocol II provides the civilian population
a “general protection against the dangers arising from military
operations.”120 It promulgates the following rule: “The civilian
population, as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of

Qualification of Armed Conflicts, GENEVA ACADEMY OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/qualification_of_armed_conflict.php
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
119 Additional Protocol II, supra note 118, at art. 4(2).
120 Id. at art. 13.
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which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.”121
D. Libya: International and Non-International Armed Conflict Legal
Protections
1. Background
The dictator Muammar Gaddafi ruled Libya since he seized
power in a military coup in 1969. During Gaddafi’s rule, U.S.-Libyan
relations deteriorated, and the Libyan government allegedly
committed a number of state-sponsored acts of terrorism against U.S.
nationals including the 1988 Lockerbie bombings.122 The regime also
pursued weapons of mass destruction, but changed its position in
2003, leading to a lifting of international sanctions.123 Still, there was
little domestic political change in Libya during this period, and
tensions intensified between the Gaddafi government, the Libyan
Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG), and the Muslim Brotherhood.124
The Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt provided a
catalyst for a domestic revolution in Libya in February 2011.125
Protests broke out in eastern region of Cyrenaica and spread to
Benghazi and the capital of Tripoli.126 On February 17, the
opposition movement, called the National Conference for the Libyan
Id. at art. 13.2
CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33142,
LIBYA:
TRANSITION
AND
U.S.
POLICY
15,
16
(2012),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33142.pdf; Ian Black & Peter Beaumont,
Gaddafi ordered Lockerbie bombing- ex-minister, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 23, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/23/gaddafi-lockerbie-bombingminister-libya.
123 BLANCHARD, supra note 122, at 16.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Protests in Libya: Blood in the Streets, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE (Feb. 20,
2011, 16:40),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/02/protests_libya. See also
Maggie Michael & Bassem Mroue, Libya Protests: Tripoli in Open Revolt, Pro-Gaddafi
Gangs Terrorize Capital, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/26/libya-protests-tripolire_n_828586.html.
121
122
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Opposition (an umbrella group made up of several anti-Gaddafi
groups),127 declared a “Day of Rage” protest.128 By the next day,
sources reported that the opposition movement had taken over areas
of Benghazi and Cyrenaica.129 The Gaddafi regime reacted violently
to the calls for reform, vowing to track down and kill protestors
“house by house.”130 Human rights groups reported that the
government killed hundreds of civilians including women and
children in the initial crackdown against protestors.131 According to
media reports, Gaddafi also indiscriminately bombed areas with
helicopters and warplanes.132 At the end of February, the United
Nations passed a resolution to freeze the assets of Gaddafi and his
affiliates and send the matter to the ICC for investigation.133 In
March, the Security Council passed another resolution that
authorized a no-fly zone over Libya, demanded an end to attacks
against civilians, and authorized member States to take all necessary
measures to protect civilians in danger in Libya.
Following U.N. authorization, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France led a NATO coalition against Libyan

127 CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD & JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL33142, LIBYA: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 1 (2011),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/157348.pdf.
128 THE LIBYAN REVOLUTION, ARAB SPRING: A RESEARCH AND STUDY
GUIDE, http://guides.library.cornell.edu/content.php?pid=259276&sid=2163152
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
129 BLANCHARD & ZANOTTI, supra note 127, at 1.
130 Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Gaddafi’s Grip on the Capital
Tightens
as
Revolt
Grows,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
22,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/africa/23libya.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=1&.
131 Fahim & Kirkpatrick, supra note 130; Nick Meo, Libya protests: 140
‘massacred’ as Gaddafi sends in snipers to crush dissent, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 20, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/833593
4/Libya-protests-140-massacred-as-Gaddafi-sends-in-snipers-to-crush-dissent.html.
132 Richard Spencer, Libya: Muammar Gaddafi fires on his own people, THE
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 21, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/833934
7/Libya-Muammar-Gaddafi-fires-on-his-own-people.html.
133 Security Council imposes sanctions on Libyan authorities in bid to stem violent
repression,
U.N.
NEWS
CENTRE
(Feb,
26,
2011),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37633#.unIO2lGmDww.
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government forces, known as Operation Unified Defender.134 By
August, the opposition was able to attack Gaddafi strongholds, and
the Libyan National Transitional Council had killed Gaddafi and
established control over Libyan territory.135 By November 2011,
NATO forces had withdrawn from Libya.136
2. Classification
The conflict in Libya qualifies as “Season D”—IHL
protections apply for IAC and NIAC, and ICL protections also
apply. An IAC generally refers to an armed conflict between states or,
as previously discussed,137 an internal armed conflict that is
internationalized by foreign state intervention, as was the case in
Libya.
Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, an
IAC exists in the case of “declared war or of any other armed
conflict . . . between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by them.”138 A state does
not have to formally declare war, nor do all parties to the conflict
have to recognize the armed conflict for the situation to qualify as an
international armed conflict and trigger IHL protections.139
The conflict between the Libyan government and domestic
rebel forces met the organization and intensity requirements of a
NIAC. Beginning in February 2011, the situation could be classified
as a NIAC due to the organization and intensity of the fighting
134 Ivo H. Daalder & James G. Stavridis, NATO’s Victory in Libya: The
Right
Way
to
Run
an
Intervention,
91
FOR.
AFF.
(2012),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-james-gstavridis/natos-victory-in-libya; NATO and Libya: Operation Unified Protector, NATO
OTAN (Feb./Oct. 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm.
135 Id.
136 UN Security Council votes to end Libya operations, BBC, Oct. 27, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15481143.
137 See infra Part III.C(2) (discussing internationalization of an noninternational armed conflict).
138 Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Article 2 is common to all
Geneva Conventions.
139 Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 116, at 32.
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between the Libyan government and opposition forces.140 The rebels
were organized under the National Conference for the Libyan
Opposition and, within the first days of the conflict, gained control
of significant areas of Libyan territory.141 Both sides employed
military-grade weapons, including “automatic weapons, rocketpropelled grenades, and heavy machine guns.” The government has
also used tanks and surface-to-air missiles.142
As the conflict continued and the government’s abuses came
to light, the Security Council authorized U.N. members to take all
means necessary to protect civilians.143 By the end of March, NATO
forces had taken international military action in Libya, which
internationalized the civil conflict by direct intervention. IAC
protections were triggered once fighting between NATO and the
Libyan government commenced, while NIAC protections applied to
the conflict between the government and domestic opposition forces.
In August, the opposition forces took control of Tripoli and held the
Gaddafi stronghold of Sirte by October 2011.144 This marked the
initial de-escalation of the revolution and eventual end of both armed
conflicts.
The conflict in Libya can be described as a “mixed” IACNIAC conflict. Between February and November 2011, Libya was
engaged in both non-international and international armed
conflicts.145 The revolution against Gaddafi began in February 2011
as a non-international armed conflict; in March 2011, with NATO’s

140

See infra Season Three discussion on organization and intensity criteria,

Part II.C.1.
CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD & JIM ZANOTTI, supra note 121, at 1.
Harriet Sherwood & Xan Rice, Gaddafi troops captured in Tunisia while
fighting intensifies in Misrata, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 29, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/29/gaddafi-troops-captured-intunisia.
143 S.C. Res. 1973, paras. 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
144 Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime
Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 358 (2012).
145 Libya: Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project, GENEVA ACADEMY OF
INT’L
HUMANITARIAN
LAW
AND
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://www.genevaacademy.ch/RULAC/applicable_international_law.php?id_stat
e=128 (last updated Feb. 28, 2012).
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intervention, the conflict became a mixed IAC-NIAC. In November,
when NATO forces withdrew and the National Transitional Council
consolidated power, the situation returned to a conflict of a noninternational nature. By February 2012, there was no longer an armed
conflict of either type in Libya.
3. Protections
The conflict between the Gaddafi regime and NATO forces
triggered IAC protections under the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I. IAC triggers the highest degree of protections
for civilians and combatants under IHL. Separately, the conflict
between the Libyan government and rebel forces triggered NIAC
protections.146
IAC law affords protection to the wounded and sick,
prisoners of war (POWs), and the civilian population. During IAC,
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I regulate the
conduct of warfare.
First, the Geneva Conventions provide protections for the
sick and wounded of the armed forces during both land and naval
conflicts.147 Such personnel are regarded as “ ‘hors de combat,’ [and]
from that moment sacred and inviolable.”148 Under the Conventions,
they
shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Parties
to the conflict in whose power they may be, without
any adverse distinction founded on sex, race,
nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other
similar criteria. Any attempts upon their lives, or
violence to their persons, shall be strictly prohibited;
See infra Part II.C.3.
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 134
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
148 Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 116, at 132.
146
147
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in particular, they shall not be murdered or
exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological
experiments; they shall not wilfully be left without
medical assistance and care, nor shall conditions
exposing them to contagion or infection be created.149
Second, the Geneva Conventions require state parties to
protect POWs. POW status is specifically reserved for combatants
taking part in international armed conflict. POWs must be “humanely
treated” and “[a]ny unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power
causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war
in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach
of the present Convention.”150 The Third Geneva Convention
forbids “physical mutilation or . . . medical or scientific experiments
of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his
interest.”151 The Convention also maintains a standard of humane
treatment for combatants during the time of captivity.152 POWs are
protected from physical and mental torture for purposes of
information153 and have the right to complain about the conditions of
their captivity.154
Finally, the Conventions protect civilians and civilian objects
under the rule of distinction. As a rule, “the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objects and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives.”155 Civilians are protected from being the “object of
Geneva Conventions I, supra note 147, at art. 12; Geneva Conventions
II, supra note 147, at art. 12.
150 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III].
151 Id.
152 See id. at arts. 13, 17-18, 26, 29, 78.
153 Id., at art. 17.
154 Id., at art. 78.
155 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I),
arts. 48-52, Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol
I].
149
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attack . . . [and] [a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population . . . .”156
As a general rule, “the right of Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”157 Under
article 35 of API,
(2) [i]t is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. (3)
It is [also] prohibited to employ methods or means of
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to
the natural environment.158
Military strategy must also take into account the principle of
proportionality. As applied,
the attack must be directed against a military objective
with means which are not disproportionate in relation
to the objective, but are suited to destroying only that
objective, and the effects of the attacks must be
limited in the way required by the Protocol;
‘moreover,’ even after those conditions are fulfilled,
the incidental civilian losses and the damages must
not be excessive.159
If faced with several options “for obtaining a similar military
advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and
to civilian objects.”160

156
157
158
159
160

Id. at art. 51(2).
Id. at art. 35(1).
Id. at art. 35.
Id. at art. 51(5); Commentary to Additional Protocol I, 624-25.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 155, at art. 57(c)(3).
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III. JUSTIFIED AND UNJUSTIFIED DIFFERENCES IN PROTECTIONS
UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law did not apply to the Arab Spring in a
uniform manner. Although IHL protections only applied in Libya
and Syria, ICL offered a baseline of protection for civilians facing
egregious government attacks in Egypt and Bahrain. For the armed
conflicts in Libya and Syria, IHL provided a lower degree of
protection for civilians and combatants in Syria’s civil war than in
Libya’s international conflict. This distinction is unjustified because it
assigns a different weight to human integrity based on the sovereign
status of the parties to the conflict. In addition, it does not reflect the
reality that NIAC poses an equivalent, if not greater, threat to
affected populations and the international community. A lesser
protection regime also provides the opportunity for abuse during
NIAC. Furthermore, the dual system of a mixed conflict creates
practical problems of legal compliance and enforcement.
A. ICL v. IHL: A Justified Distinction
Distinctions between international criminal (“Season B”) and
humanitarian (“Season C” and “Season D”) legal protections under
the current regime are justified. ICL (non-war crime) liability applies
irrespective of an armed conflict. It prohibits large-scale violations
against the civilian population, including crimes against humanity and
genocide. In contrast, IHL protections are triggered by the existence
of an armed conflict. It provides a set of protections specific to
armed conflict that address combatants, prisoners of war, and
civilians through the principles of distinction and proportionality.
ICL protections are better suited to situations that do not rise
to the level of an armed conflict. During an armed conflict, IHL
recognizes legally permissible killings while providing protections to
persons not taking part in hostilities. For example, CA3 prohibits the
killing of individuals not taking part in the conflict, and IAC goes
further, requiring that attacks be carried out in a manner “expected to
cause the least danger to civilian objects.”161 In situations of non-

161

Id. at art. 57.
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armed conflict, IHL would not apply; however, ICL protections
trigger criminal liability for widespread or systematic attack against
the population. ICL liability depends on the impact on the affected
population without any reference to military calculations.
The distinction between international criminal and
humanitarian legal protections is justified. ICL protections are
important intermediary protections between basic international
human rights protections and international protections exclusive to
the time of war.
B. IAC v. NIAC: An Unjustified Distinction
The distinction between IAC (“Season C”) and NIAC
(“Season D”) in IHL is unjustified. Protections are assigned based on
the sovereign status of the parties, ignoring the factual reality that
NIAC threatens vulnerable populations as well. Thus, the IAC-NIAC
distinction is unjustified because it fails to provide a uniform legal
standard of protections against potential atrocities. This is illustrated
by the comparison of Libya and Syria, which did not merit the same
protections under current international law.
While IHL affords a lesser degree of protections in Syria, the
civil war poses a greater threat to the population and international
security than the Libyan conflict. Libya and Syria both experienced
prolonged periods of violence. In Libya, the IAC lasted for eight
months; and, by October 2011, the combined casualties for the IAC
and NIAC were estimated at 25,000.162 By July 2013, the Syrian
conflict had been ongoing for more than two years with a death
count exceeding 100,000 including more than 36,000 civilians.163 The
Syrian civil conflict has greatly destabilized the region, creating almost
two million refugees,164 drawing in mercenaries and foreign
162 Ian Black, Libyan revolution casualties lower than expected, says new
government,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Jan.
8,
2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/08/libyan-revolution-casualtieslower-expected-government.
163 Syria
death toll tops 100,000, TELEGRAPH, Jun. 26, 2013,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10142892/Syriadeath-toll-tops-100000.html.
164 McDonnell, supra note 95.
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fighters,165 and heightening sectarian violence.166 Despite the
seriousness of the civil conflict, IHL affords a lesser degree of
protection in Syria than the Libyan armed conflict.
Under the Geneva Conventions, CA3 is the only provision
that applies in Syria.167 CA3 does not govern the conduct of warfare
or distinguish the wounded combatant from the general population.
In the absence of a POW status, Common Article 3 protects the
captured combatant from inhumane treatment and unfair
prosecution; however, the individual remains vulnerable to national
laws against treason and other crimes. In effect, CA3 is a
compromised text, weighing the concern for human integrity against
the state’s interest in sovereign authority to govern its internal
affairs.168 It “merely provides for the application of the principles of
the Convention and not for the application of specific
provisions . . . .”169 Under CA3, the Syrian government is held to
general principles and allowed greater flexibility relative to IAC in its
conduct against perceived threats.
In contrast, the Libyan armed conflict triggered an extensive
number of provisions that, unlike CA3, are more specific, practical,
and less vague.170 As a rule, IAC requires the parties to distinguish
Bassem Mroue, Assad says Syria is fighting foreign mercenaries, TORONTO
STAR, May 16, 2012,
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/05/16/assad_says_syria_is_fighting_f
oreign_mercenaries.html.
166 See AMB. FREDERIC C. HOF, RAFIK HARIRI & ALEX SIMON, THE
CENTER FOR THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN SYRIA’S
CIVIL WAR: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MITIGATION
(2013), http://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20130325-syria-report.pdf.
167 See Commentary to the Geneva Conventions I, supra note 116.
168 See id. at 48. “It [art. 3] at least ensures the application of the rules of
humanity which are recognized as essential by civilized nations and provides a legal
basis for charitable interventions by the International Committee of the Red Cross
or any other impartial humanitarian organization—interventions which in the past
were all too often refused on the ground that they represented unfriendly
interference in the internal affairs of a State.”
169 Id.
170 Id. at 150 (comparing Article 15 with Common Article 3, which
provides general principles of protection without specific provisions as to the
parties responsibilities and conduct in achieving the protections).
165
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between civilians and military objects and “direct their operations
only against military objectives.”171 Civilians are protected from being
the “object of attack . . . [and] [a]cts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population . . . .”172 Furthermore, IAC limits the means of warfare 173
and requires military action to adhere to the principle of
proportionality.174 IAC protections also give legal status to the
wounded and sick and “lay down the actual steps to be taken for
their benefit from the moment they fall on the battlefield.”175 POW
status also applies to captured combatants and confers a series of
protections that maintain a standard for humane treatment during the
time of custody.176
In Nicaragua, the ICJ referred to CA3, which applies in Syria,
as “rules which, in the court’s opinion, reflect . . . ‘elementary
considerations of humanity.’”177 Protocol II (which applies to certain
non-international armed conflicts) embodies, to an extent, the
principle of distinction,178 but, as the Commentary points out,
“[u]nlike Protocol I [related to international armed conflict], which
contains detailed rules, only the fundamental principles on protection
for the civilian population are formulated in Protocol II . . . .”179 Even
these fundamental protections may not apply in Syria because Syria is
not party to Protocol II. Although courts and states can interpret and
apply rules of IAC to NIAC as customary law,180 the codified regime
at the core of IHL protections still differentiates the situation and the
applicable protections. There is significant disagreement over the
Additional Protocol I, supra note 155, at arts. 48-52.
Id. at art. 51(2).
173 Id. at art. 35.
174 Id. at art. 51(5); Commentary to Additional Protocol I at 624-25.
175 Commentary to Geneva Convention I, supra note 116, at 150
(discussing art. 15).
176 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 150, at arts. 13, 17, 18, 26, 29,
78.
177 Nicaragua, supra note 106. The ICJ views Common Article 3 as
reflecting the “elementary considerations of humanity” referred to in its prior 1949
opinion of Corfu Channel, Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 22 (April 9).
178 See infra note 194.
179 Commentary to Additional Protocol II, supra note 117, at 4762.
180 See INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 77.
171
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substance of customary international law, creating ambiguity in
possibly applying and enforcing IAC protections in NIAC. The IACNIAC distinction is mirrored in ICL war crimes liability established
by the Rome Statute.
The IAC-NIAC distinction is also subject to abuse. During
NIAC, the government or opposition forces may take advantage of
the less restrictive protections regime, especially if the state is not a
party to subsequent agreements that regulate the conduct of war. In
Syria, for example, President Assad used cluster bombs against the
oppositional forces with significant impact on the civilian population.
The legal argument against the use of cluster bombs is stronger under
IAC either because they violate articulated rules of distinction or
because many states have banned their use,181 but this protection is
less clear in NIAC.182 Because Syria is not party to the Convention on
Cluster Munitions, the government might legitimately argue their use
is permissible under the current legal regime. A similar analysis
applies to the use of chemical weapons. At the start of the current
conflict, Syria was not a party to the Chemical Weapons
Convention(CWC), which prohibits the use of chemical weapons,
and it did not join the CWC until October 2013.183 Although IHL
regulates the use of weapons during IAC,184 it does not include a
similar provision for NIAC unless agreed to in arrangements beyond
the Geneva Conventions.
In addition to the potential for abuse by government forces,
current international law leaves “little incentive for insurgent forces
to comply with laws of war . . . [and] granting the privileges to
insurgents might promote greater reciprocity on their part.”185 NIAC
offers few protections for and restrictions on the opposition group.
This increases the likelihood that the opposition will also commit
atrocities and ignore basic humanitarian concerns. In the case of
See Additional Protocol II, supra note 118, at art. 13.
See id.
183 Blake & Mahmud, supra note 69, at 250.
184 Additional Protocol I, supra note 155, at art. 35.
185 James G. Stewart, Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international
humanitarian law: A critique of internationalized armed conflict, 85 INT’L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 313, 347 (2003),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_850_stewart.pdf.
181
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Syria, the opposition has allegedly committed human rights abuses
for which it should be held accountable. Elimination of the IACNIAC distinction would promote greater compliance on both sides,
offering greater protections and incentive for adhering to
international law.
The continuation of a dual system of protections also poses
theoretical and practical problems. Situations that trigger both sets of
protections, the so-called “mixed conflict,” create confusion and
complicate the application of IHL. For example, Libya hosted both
an NIAC and IAC, creating a dual system of law within a single
conflict. To determine the applicable protections regime, each
engagement would require a separate evaluation and classification as
part of the international or non-international armed conflict. Mixed
conflicts may further complicate the analyses in situations when
opposition forces of each armed conflict physically mix during an
altercation. Furthermore, the current system creates virtuous and
vicious cycles of protections. For example, when the international
community decides in favor of intervention (as was the case in
Libya), the internationalization of that conflict leads to a greater set
of protections. On the other hand, in Syria, the international
community’s failure to act has led to lesser protections because the
conflict remains non-international. These cycles are also problematic
because they give bodies such as the Security Council or NATO
considerable power in determining the legal protections that apply to
a conflict, instead of creating standing and determinate legal regimes.
Yet, the most apparent flaw of the dual system is its assignment of
two protections regimes in the same conflict, in which one set of
protections arbitrarily gives a different weight to human integrity
depending on the sovereign status of the oppositional force.
Ultimately, the IAC-NIAC distinction assigns a different weight to
human integrity depending on the sovereign status of the parties to
the conflict. In Tadic, the ICTY argued that the different weight given
to human integrity under current IHL was unjust. The court asked:
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or
ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of
hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as
well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary
suffering when two sovereign states are engaged in
200

2014

Blake & Mahmud

3:1

war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or
providing the same protection when armed violence
has erupted ‘only’ within the territory of a sovereign
state? If international law, while of course duly
safeguarding the legitimate interests of states, must
gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it is
only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy
should gradually lose its weight.186
A dual system of law in a mixed conflict is avoidable if the
NIAC is “internationalized,” thereby applying one protections regime
to both conflicts. However, one must apply a burdensome and
uncertain test on whether or not the conflict has met the criteria to
be “internationalized”—a standard which international courts
continue to debate. For example, Syria already exhibits some factors
of foreign involvement that suggest a future internationalized
conflict. However, the transition from NIAC to IAC is a gray area
and difficult to determine. Eliminating the distinction between IAC
and NIAC would also resolve the internationalization dilemma by
rendering it a moot point and making universal application of IHL
less complicated and contentious.
Finally, the international character of modern civil conflicts
justifies a collapsed single protection regime. This would reflect the
reality of domestic conflict and its contribution to international
destabilization. For example, although Syria is involved in a
traditional civil war, numerous foreign states have been affected.
Regional security concerns have prompted the direct involvement of
Israel, Turkey, and Lebanon. In addition, the refugee situation has
impacted Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. The Syrian
conflict is not an isolated situation. Foreign alliances currently play a
role in providing military and non-military assistance to both parties
to the conflict.

186

Tadic Interlocutory Appeal, supra note 76, at para. 97.
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IV. THE SOVEREIGNTY PROBLEM
In the latter part of the twentieth century, international legal
trends have transformed the concept of state sovereignty. Current
analysis of the Arab Spring demonstrates that sovereignty norms in
ICL and IHL must be interpreted in light of these changes. The next
section describes the foundations and transformation of state
sovereignty and argues that the current problems in applying IHL
and ICL to the Arab Spring are attributed to an undue preference for
traditional and outdated conceptions of sovereignty. The Geneva
Conventions were ratified in the 1940s and the Rome Statute in the
1990s. They preceded the changing conceptions of sovereignty in the
latter part of the twentieth century and the emergence of the
Responsibility to Protect movement in the beginning of the twentyfirst century, respectively. IHL and ICL should be understood in light
of changing contexts and the international understanding of
sovereignty. Given the continued occurrence of armed conflict in the
modern era and the international community’s changing
understanding of sovereignty, we must re-evaluate the current
treatment and application of IHL and ICL protections. International
protections should be a uniform standard of protections that apply to
all populations affected by conflict, genocide, and crimes against
humanity.
A. IAC-NIAC Distinction Incompatible with Sovereignty Trends
The problems identified in this Article stem from the same
conceptual source: sovereignty. The IAC-NIAC distinction reflects
the traditional sensitivity of a state’s right to govern its domestic
affairs without intrusion. The drafting history shows that states
vehemently opposed a single protection regime for armed conflict
(IAC and NIAC), fearing that internal insurgencies would take
advantage of international protections from domestic action and gain
legal status.187 Historically, as the Commentary points out,
Commentary to the Geneva Convention I, supra note 116, at art. 3,
para. 60. The last sentence of Article 3 prohibits such protections from conferring
legal status on the belligerent group. This “meets the fear—always the same one—
that the application of the Convention, even to a very limited extent, in cases of
civil war may interfere with the de jure Government’s lawful suppression of the
187
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“[a]pplications by a foreign Red Cross or by the International
Committee of the Red Cross have more than once been treated as
unfriendly attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the country
concerned.”188
Similarly, ICL protections are also limited because of
sovereignty concerns. The Rome Statute is a consent-based
document, consistent with the Westphalian model in that states are
only bound to the international law to which they agree.189 Many
countries, including the United States, Israel, and most Arab states
are not party to the Rome Statute. This creates practical enforcement
issues. Similarly, Security Council action and ICC referral are based
on the consent of the five permanent members (P5). As noted by
international legal scholar Andrew Guzman,
[a]ny issue that is of truly global importance will affect
each of the P5 members in a different way and a
resolution can only be adopted if each of them
believes it to serve their interests . . . The need to
focus on areas where the P5 can agree limits the
Council to a relatively small subset of the world’s
problems.190
B. Foundations of Sovereignty
Traditional sovereignty or “the conception that a state must
have control of its external policies and be free of external authority
structures is an essentially European invention, dating from the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries”191 with the signing of the Treaty

revolt, or that it may confer belligerent status, and consequently increased
authority, upon the adverse Party.”
188 Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 116, at art. 3,
para. 39.
189 For a recent argument that consent should be minimized in
international law, see Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747
(2012).
190 Id. at 780.
191 Robert O. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the
United States, 40 JCMS 743 (2002),
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of Westphalia.192 At the time, Hugo Grotius, the “father of
international law”193 conceived of “an authentic law of nations which
was based on the ‘mutual consent’ of sovereigns acting in the context
of a ‘great society of States.’”194 The paradox of this system, however,
was that “sovereignty created the territorial state and the international
system.”195 This system would be held together by states that were
each independent and did not have to answer to a higher authority.
Stephen Krasner identifies several sovereignty typologies
including Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty.
According to Krasner, Westphalian sovereignty is the idea that a
“state has the right to determine its own authority structures, which
implies that states should avoid intervening in each other’s internal
affairs.”196 International legal sovereignty is the idea that “juridically
independent territorial entities merit recognition and with it such
rights and privileges as membership in international organizations.”197

http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic162929.files/B_Political_Integration/K
eohaneIroniesOfSovereignty.pdf.
192 While the peace of Westphalia was a significant watershed moment in
the international system and for the codification of traditional sovereignty norms
“[it] was not a clear break with the past: political entities with exclusive control over
a well-defined territory existed well before the Peace…” Stephen D. Krasner,
Westphalia and All That, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993),
http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/faculty/hauser/PS362/KrasnerIdeasForeignPolicyWe
stphalia.pdf.
193 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1609, 1609 (1995).
194 Mark W. Janis, Sovereignty and International Law: Hobbes and Grotius, in
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 391, 396 (Ronald St. John Macdonald ed.,
1993) (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 20 (Francis
W. Kelsey trans., The Classics of International Law vol. 2) (1913)).
195 FRANCIS M. DENG, SADAIKIEL KIMARO, TERRENCE LYONS,
DONALD ROTHCHILD & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY
11 (1996).
196 Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and Human Rights 71 (Univ. of Denver
Hum. Rts. & Welfare Working Paper, Paper No. 21, 2004),
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/workingpapers/2004/21-donnelly-2004.pdf.
197 Stephen D. Krasner, The Case for Shared Sovereignty, 16 J. OF
DEMOCRACY 69, 70-71 (2005).
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The United Nations Charter, the foundational document of
modern international law, enshrines both concepts of sovereignty
and also sets their limits. Article 2(4) of the Charter upholds the
notion of Westphalian sovereignty, asserting that states “shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . .”198
Chapter VII of the Charter then limits that sovereignty by giving
power to the Security Council to take military and non-military action
against a member to “restore international peace and security.”199
Article 2(1) of the Charter codifies international legal
sovereignty, stating that the United Nations is “based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”200 State membership in
the United Nations necessarily enhances international legal
sovereignty by recognizing each state as an independent and
legitimate legal entity, able to enter into treaties and conventions and
participate in the General Assembly, Security Council, and other
U.N. bodies. Chapter II of the Charter then sets out mechanisms and
justifications for limiting international legal sovereignty by expelling
members from various U.N. committees or from the U.N. itself.201
C. Transformation of Sovereignty: The Fading of the Westphalian
Model
In the latter part of the twentieth century, international trends
have transformed the concept of sovereignty and have eroded the
prominence of Westphalian sovereignty. States have acceded to
international regimes that promote universal standards, agreed to the
jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and authorized nongovernmental bodies to monitor and enforce states’ commitments. In
exercise of their legal sovereignty, states have consented to external
authorities and thereby weakened the Westphalian model. These
international trends are illustrated in the fields of human rights,
international security, and the creation of international criminal
courts.
198
199
200
201

U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
Id., at art. 39.
Id., at art. 2(1).
Id., at arts. 3-6.
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1. Human rights
In the twentieth century, human rights protections have
gained universal standing with states that have acceded to agreements
and joined organizations that promote global norms for human
rights.202 States “enter into such [human rights] accords with the full
understanding that in so doing they might limit their own autonomy
by altering domestic views about legitimate behavior, authorizing
external monitoring of internal practices, or creating third-party
adjudication procedures that give individual citizens, not just states,
legal standing.”203 Each is evidence to the fact that the state no longer
enjoys the exclusive right to define humane treatment under its
jurisdiction.
2. International security
International security institutions illustrate states’ consent for
an international body to take coercive measures against a sovereign.
Under Art. 42 of the United Nations Charter, “[s]hould the Security
Council consider that measures provided for in Art. 41 [use of unarmed force] would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.” Such
enforcement actions are exceptions to Art. 2(7) and the limitations on
intervention in “matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state . . . .”204 States have also agreed to support
the Council’s decisions, even if they are non-permanent members or
took no part in the vote. This further violates the Westphalian
system, which promotes the state’s external authority and “prohibits
governments from agreeing to rules defining a process, over which it
does not have a veto, that can confer obligations not specifically
provided for in the original agreement.” Beyond supporting the

202

STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 110-

12 (1999).
203
204

Id. at 106.
U.N. Charter art. 2(7).

206

2014

Blake & Mahmud

3:1

Council’s decisions, some states have supported military intervention
absent Security Council authorization for humanitarian reasons.205
3. International criminal courts
The enforcement of international criminal law has made
significant progress in the twentieth century with the creation of
international courts and tribunals.206 Following World War II, the
London Agreement of August 8, 1945, called for a “trial of war
crimes whose offenses have no particular geographic location.”207
This established the Trial of German Major War Criminals, known as
the Nuremberg Trial, and, in Asia, the Allied Forces established a
similar proceeding known as the Tokyo Tribunal. Both tribunals
exercised jurisdiction over individuals charged with crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. These adjudications
enforced the principle of individual liability for international crimes208
and international adjudication, independent of the state where the
crimes occurred or the nationality of the actors.
In the 1990s, the United Nations created tribunals to address
the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.209 In both cases,
See infra Part IV.D (discussing humanitarian intervention and the
emerging norm of responsibility to protect).
206 The 1919 Treaty of Versailles included provisions for an international
tribunal and domestic military courts (of the Allied and Associated Powers) to try
German officials. The enforcement of such provisions was unsuccessful. However,
the Netherlands refused to extradite the Kaiser, and the other provisions of the
Treaty were unsuccessfully enforced. See BETH VAN SCHAAK & RON SLYE, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 23-25 (2007) (referring to
arts. 227-28 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles).
207 London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279.
208 Judgment of Nuremberg Tribunal (also cited in the Rome Statute). In
its judgment, the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that “crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals
who commit such crimes can international criminal law be enforced.”
209 The ICTY was established by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(May 25, 1993), and the ICTR was established by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). The United Nations also assisted in the establishment
of criminal tribunals for atrocities associated with Cambodia, East Timore, and
Sierra Leone.
205
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the Security Council cited the situation “to constitute a threat to
international peace and security,” a clear reference to its Chapter VII
powers and the states’ assent to international action in domestic
affairs. The tribunals function under the procedures and substantive
rules of their respective Statutes and outside the domestic judicial
system. Both Statutes include general provisions for a fair trial; 210
reference to the international standard of due process under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;211 and an
appeals process with interlocutory review and a separate Appeals
Chamber.212 The Statutes include substantive provisions that assign
individual criminal responsibility,213 and the tribunals exercise
personal, territorial, and temporal jurisdiction.214 The tribunals have
concurrent jurisdiction with national courts.215 However, they take
precedence over domestic proceedings,216 and national adjudication
does not bar the tribunal from initiating a subsequent proceeding.
Whereas the ICTY and ICTR are limited to their respective conflicts,
the ICC is “a permanent institution and shall have the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern . . . .”217

210 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 15, Annex to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993),
http://www.icty.org/sid/135 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
211 Id. at art. 21. See also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, art. 14, Annex to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994),
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement
(adopting the rules of procedure and evidence of the ICTY) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
212 ICTY Statute, supra note 211, at art. 25(1). See also ICTR Statute, supra
note 212, at art. 12 (stating the original intention for the ICTR to share the same
Appeals Chamber as created under the ICTY Statute).
213 ICTY Statute, supra note 211, at art. 7; ICTR Statute, supra note 212, at
art. 6.
214 ICTY Statute, supra note 211, at arts. 6, 8; ICTR Statute, supra note
212, at arts. 5,7.
215 ICTR Statute, supra note 212, at art. 8(1); ICTY Statute, supra note
211, at art. 9(1).
216 ICTY Statute, supra note 211, at art. 9(2); ICTR Statute, supra note
212, at art. 8(2) (granting concurrent jurisdiction with “primacy over the national
courts of all States.”).
217 Rome Statute, supra note 15, at art. 1.
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The creation of international criminal courts arguably violates
a state’s Westphalian sovereignty by giving power to an entity outside
of the state’s control. First, the courts are created by third parties,
whether by a coalition of states or an international organization such
as the United Nations. The trial is generally outside the state’s judicial
system, and its procedures are established through external
documents (Charters and Statutes) also adopted by third parties.
Second, these tribunals create substantive changes to the state’s penal
system. They impose international standards and assign individual
liability, prosecuting conduct for which there may not be a domestic
equivalent.218 Third, international courts exercise jurisdiction over the
individuals of or conduct that occurred in a particular state that
would otherwise fall under the state’s sovereign jurisdiction.219 The
tribunals and courts take precedence over national proceedings, a
stark contradiction to the traditional notion that a state has primary
authority to govern its own affairs.
D. Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The emergence of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) represents
a culmination of the decline of traditional notions of Westphalian
sovereignty in international law. It is a recent doctrine that highlights
the importance of humanitarian protections against absolute
sovereignty. The IAC-NIAC distinction is incompatible with this
notion that humanitarian protections are not secondary to
sovereignty concerns.
Responsibility to Protect is an emerging norm that recognizes
(1) the jus cogens, or fundamental nature of the
prohibition against atrocity crimes; (2) historical state
practice regarding humanitarian intervention; and (3)
218 See London Agreement, supra note 208, for the definition of “crimes
against humanity.”
219 See ICTR Statute, supra note 212, at arts. 1, 5-8 (establishing the
competence of the tribunal, personal jurisdiction, individual criminal responsibility,
territorial and temporal jurisdiction, and concurrent jurisdiction); S.C. Res. 827,
supra note 210 (establishing a tribunal “for the prosecution of persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 . . .”).
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opinio juris, or state belief, that when atrocity crimes
are unchecked within a state, the threat to
international stability is so great that states can
justifiably use force for the limited purpose of
stopping these crimes.220
At the 2005 United Nations World Summit, “Heads of State
and Government unanimously endorsed the Responsibility to
Protect, pledging to never again abandon people threatened by the
crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic
cleansing.”221 The Summit, first, affirmed the view that, “[w]hen
individual states fail to protect their own populations, they have no
sovereign right to nonintervention.”222 It also “set a new standard for
the United Nations and the international community as a whole:
Failure to take action to protect populations from genocide and other
atrocities is failure to fulfill a clearly acknowledged duty.”223 Of
importance, R2P challenges the sovereign right of nonintervention
that is the primary characteristic of the Westphalian model. The IACNIAC distinction fails to reflect the current understanding that
traditional sovereignty has given way to universal standards and
protections.
According to Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the
end of the twentieth century:
A major intellectual requirement of our time is to
rethink the question of sovereignty—not to weaken
its essence, which is crucial to international security
and cooperation, but to recognize that it may take
more than one form and perform more than one
function. This perception could help solve problems
both within and among states. And underlying the
rights of the individual and the rights of peoples is a
dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in all
PUB. INT’L L. & POL’Y GRP., supra note 108, at 7.
Id.
222 Alicia L. Bannon, Comment, The Responsibility to Protect: The U.N. World
Summit and the Question of Unilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. 1157, 1161 (2006).
223 Id. at 1162.
220
221

210

2014

Blake & Mahmud

3:1

humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate
involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole.
It is a sense that increasingly finds expression in the
gradual expansion of international law.224
V. SOLUTIONS
A. International Humanitarian Law Solutions
Populations affected by armed conflict should benefit from
the same regime of heightened protections. This requires the creation
of one protection regime for all armed conflict that corrects the
existing flaws. Armed conflict should be evaluated under a uniform
standard, irrespective of its international nature, to determine
whether or not the situation triggers IHL protections. This analysis
should consider such factors that infer an adverse effect on the
population and need for a protections regime. Second, the same
protections regime should apply to all populations in armed conflict.
For the purposes of IHL protections, we propose that
“armed conflict” be defined as the following:
(a) conflict between two or more organized armed forces
under the responsible command of authorities, with the
ability to exercise control over the territory, engaged in
fighting of some intensity; or
(b) a conflict between two or more states, or declared war
between two or more states.
Subpart (b) embodies the traditional notion of international
armed conflict. It reflects the situation of imminent or actual conflict
where a hierarchal command (the state) intends to use, or has already
used, armed force.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71 FOR. AFF. 99
(1992),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48466/boutros-boutrosghali/empowering-the-united-nations.
224
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Subpart (a) eliminates the distinction between IAC and NIAC
in favor of criteria that indicate a situation of intense violence and
need for international protections. This standard incorporates the
elements of armed conflict, irrespective of the parties’ status as
sovereign states. It requires the existence of two or more organized
armed forces under the responsible command of authorities. The
criterion of a responsible command “implies some degree of
organization of the insurgent armed group or dissident armed
forces . . . . It means an organization capable, on the one hand, of
planning and carrying out sustained and concerted operations, and on
the other, of imposing discipline in the name of a de facto
authority.”225 The existence of an armed force with an identifiable
command distinguishes the armed conflict from internal disturbance
and does not affect the state’s ability to handle insurgencies or
situations of unorganized violence.226 Subpart (a) also requires the
authorities to have “the ability to control the territory.” This criterion
assures the ability of all parties—whether states or opposition
forces—to enforce the rules of war.
A significant level of organization and territorial control for
the insurgent party is required. This is “likely to exclude internal
disturbances, riots, and terrorist activities from the scope of a single
body of international humanitarian law.”227 Subpart (a) also depends
on a threshold level of violence. This reflects the key value of IHL as
a protection of human life during a period of vulnerability and
potential threat.
Under the proposed definition, a situation that meets either
Subpart (a) or (b) is an armed conflict and triggers traditional IAC
protections. The protection regime should, however, contain the
caveat that the triggering of protections does not affect the legal
status of the parties. This alleviates the historical concern that
application of international protections confers legal status on rebel
forces equivalent to that of a state. Under the proposed analysis,

Commentary to Additional Protocol II, supra note 117, at 4463.
Stewart, supra note 186, at 345-46 (referring to Brazilian government’s
suggestion for APII threshold).
227 Id. at 346.
225
226
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armed conflict would trigger IAC protections, rendering CA3 and
Protocol II obsolete.
Indeed, the proposed analysis reflects the international
community’s finding that IAC-like protections and principles should
apply to NIAC. For example, the Manual on the Law of Noninternational Armed Conflict details the rules and protections that
apply during NIAC; however, many of these principles are extensions
of IAC protections interpreted by courts as customary international
law and applied to all armed conflict, including NIAC.228 Courts and
other authoritative bodies have recognized that certain aspects of
IAC are customary law for NIAC; however, which aspects apply to
NIAC remains unsettled. These developments demonstrate a
recognition that the IAC-NIAC distinction is unjustified, but at the
same time, the distinction remains a significant feature of treaty and
customary international law.
B. International Criminal Law Solutions
The undue preference for traditional sovereignty norms must
also be minimized in the current enforcement of ICL and at the ICC.
While ICC enforcement has thus far taken place in African conflicts,
the Arab Spring’s call for major judicial reform might provide a
catalyst for the Middle Eastern countries to join ICL institutions. ICL
enforcement could be achieved by promoting ICC membership
within the Arab League. Furthermore, the creation of a regional or
other independent ICC referral mechanism would encourage Arab
nations to join and make the process less politicized.
It is fitting that Tunisia, the country that set the Arab Spring
in motion, has also been the first Middle Eastern country to ratify the
Rome Statute post-Arab Spring.229 As countries in the region deal
domestically with judicial reform issues in the coming years, ICC
228 For example, the principle of military necessity is not found in
Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II. However, the ICTY has found the
principle to apply based on customary international law. See INT’L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 77.
229 Daniel Makosky, Tunisia Ratifies Rome Statute, Joining ICC, JURIST (Jun.
25, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/tunisia-ratifies-rome-statutejoining-icc.php.
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membership could aid in “national judicial reform, spurring
spates . . . to enact legislation that reflects a responsibility to ensure
accountability for grave crimes at the national level. In turn, civil
society monitors [can] ensure that governments follow through on
their commitments to combat impunity, and advance good
governance and rule of law.”230
The Arab League, with international assistance, might also set
up an ad hoc war crimes tribunal to prosecute war criminals in Syria,
the site of the most serious of the Arab Spring’s war crimes, after the
conflict has ended.231 Such an institution would be similar to the
ICTY or ICTR, or hybrid courts, and could provide a realistic
alternative to embracing international law within Arab institutions in
the absence of widespread acceptance of ICC jurisdiction.232 U.N.
investigators are currently compiling information on international
criminal violations in Syria.233 Given the scale of atrocities already
committed, the international community must identify a proper
forum for future prosecution.
CONCLUSION
The Arab Spring has been called “the world’s first true
human rights revolution: the young protestors of the Arab street
Leila Hanafi & Haidi Sadik, ICC Membership Can Protect Arab Spring
Gains, MUFTAH (Jan. 3, 2013), http://muftah.org/icc-membership-can-protectarab-spring-gains/.
231 A proposed statute for an international tribunal to prosecute Syrian
war crimes has been drafted by a group of international experts led by the Public
International
Law
and
Policy
Group.
See
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2013/1003/Revenge-or-retribution-Is-itpossible-to-prosecute-war-crimes-for-Syria.
232 Aryeh Neier, An Arab War-Crimes Court for Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/opinion/an-arab-war-crimes-courtfor-syria.html?_r=0.
233 Stephanie Nebehay, UN investigators urge ICC trials for Syria’s war
criminals,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Feb.
18,
2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0218/UNinvestigators-urge-ICC-trials-for-Syria-s-war-criminals; Ian Black, Syrian leaders
should face justice at ICC, UN says, GUARDIAN, Feb. 18, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/18/syria-murder-torture-chargesicc.
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spoke the language of democracy and human rights, and the
international community responded with the same lexicon.”234 The
Arab revolutions and international legal trends demonstrate the
global advancement and acceptance of universal human rights values
in the past sixty years. The idea that foreign intervention is justified
against states committing mass atrocity crimes against its own people
has gained widespread support. Still, international law continues to
provide inconsistent protections during armed conflicts based on the
sovereign status of the parties, and ICL continues to face
enforcement problems. While these issues are difficult to resolve, the
international community can take certain actions to correct these
concerns. These include the elimination of the unjustified distinction
between IAC and NIAC and promotion of increased ICC
membership. Time and again, the international community has
promised “never again” in the wake of the world’s most horrific
atrocities. The international community must address the flaws in its
current legal regime if it is to stand beside its promise.

Rosa Brooks, Lessons for International Law from the Arab Spring, 28 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 101 (2013).
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